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Abstract 
Recent research on reasoning about action has shown that the traditional logic form of domain 
constraints is problematic to represent ramifications of actions that are related to causality of 
domains. To handle this problem properly, as proposed by some researchers, it is necessary 
to describe causal relations of domains explicitly in action theories. In this paper, we address 
this problem from a new point of view. Specifically, unlike other researchers viewing causal 
relations as some kind of inference rules, we distinguish causal relations between defeasible 
and non-defeasible cases. It turns out that a causal theory in our formalism can be specified by 
using Reiter’s default logic. Based on this idea, we propose a causality-based minimal change 
approach for representing effects of actions, and argue that our approach provides more plausible 
solutions for the ramification and qualification problems compared with other related work. We 
also describe a logic programming approximation to compute causal theories of actions which 
provides an implementational basis for our approach. @ 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved. 
1. Introduction 
A sentence like “heavy rainfall normally causes floods” represents some causal rela- 
tion between “heavy rainfall” and “floods”. Naturally, such causal relation can be used 
to represent some causal prediction. For example, if we know that there is a heavy rain- 
fall, we would expect to have floods. From a semantical point of view, a causal relation 
is different from a logical implication. Suppose we use logical formulas to represent 
causal relations, then the causal relation “heavy rainfall causes floods” would be likely 
represented by a logical formula heavy-rainfall > JEoods. Therefore, if heavy-rainfall 
is true, then from this formula, it follows that floods is true. However, note that heavy- 
rainfall > Jloods is also logically equivalent to the formula $oods > Theavy-rainfall. 
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0304-3975/99/$-see front matter @ 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
PII: so304-3975(99)00011-0 
490 Y. Zhang I Theoretical Computer Science 220 (1999) 489-513 
It is also the case that lheauy-rainfall follows from @XX&. But it would not be 
normally regarded that no flooding is a cause of the absence of rain. 
In many of current formulations of reasoning about action and change, properties 
about the domain are normally characterized by a set of logical formulas called do- 
main constraints, and there is no difference between general logical constraints and 
causal relations. Any changes to the state of the world must be consistent with do- 
main constraints. However, as we will see next, ignoring such difference may result in 
difficulties in describing effects of actions. 
Consider the simplified stuffy room example of Ginsberg and Smith [6]. There is a 
constraint about the room which says that if both ducts in the room are blocked, then 
the room becomes stuffy. This constraint is expressed by the following formula: 
blocked(duct1) A blocked(duct2) >stufSv(room). (1) 
Suppose the initial state SO is given by the following: 
SO = {~bZocked(duct,), bZocked(ductz), ~stufSv(room)}. 
We will define state formally in Section 3. At the moment, it is sufficient to think that 
a state is simply an interpretation of a propositional language. 
Now consider an action of making duct1 blocked (i.e. the effect of the action is 
bZocked(ductl )). To predict the state resulting from the performance of this action, we 
use Winslett’s PMA [ 181 where a minimal change principle is employed for modeling 
state change. Informally, the minimal change principle in the PMA says that under 
the condition of satisfying domain constraints and the direct effect of the action, the 
dt~erence between the possible resulting state and the initial state should be minimal 
with respect to set inclusion. Therefore, we get the following two possible resulting 
states: 
S1 = {blocked(ductl), blocked(ductz), stufSy(room)}, 
S2 = {blocked(ductl), lblocked(ductz), Tstufy(room)}. 
Note that both Si and & satisfy the constraint (1) and the effect of the action blocked 
(duct1 ), and have minimal differences with the initial state SO. But intuitively, only Si 
is our desired resulting state, while S2 is quite implausible in some sense - why does 
the performance of action to make duct1 blocked imply an indirect effect of resulting 
in duct2 unblocked? This is the so-called ramification problem - the problem of how 
to derive the indirect effects of actions. 
In fact, constraint (1) is also logically equivalent to the following formula: 
blocked(duct, ) A vtuffy(room) > yblocked(ductz). (2) 
It is clear now that both Si and & are forced by (1) and (2), respectively, to have mini- 
mal differences with & with respect to the effect of action blocked(duct,). 
But semantically, (1) should not simply be a logical implication. It should represent 
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a causal relation between blocked(ductl), blocked(duct2) and stufSu(room) - the fact 
that duct1 and duct2 blocked causes the fact that the room becomes stuffy, which, for 
reasons similar to the sentence “heavy rainfall causes floods”, is not logically equivalent 
to formula (2). 
In fact, the problem of ignoring the difference between the causal relation and log- 
ical constraint in action theories has been realized by some researchers. It has been 
argued that to describe the indirect effect of actions properly, it is necessary to specify 
the causal relation of the domain explicitly. More recently, Brewka and Hertzberg, 
McCain and Turner, and Lin have independently developed alternative action theories 
to solve this problem [2, 11, 131. In their action theories, causality is explicitly taken 
into account. In particular, both Brewka and Hertzberg’s and McCain and Turner’s ap- 
proaches view causal relations as kinds of inference rules, while Lin’s method employs 
a specific predicate Caused to represent causality in the circumscription-based action 
theory. 
However, as we will argue later in this paper, all of their methods, more or less, 
suffer from some restrictions and hence are not entirely satisfactory. The goal of this 
paper is to propose a new formal approach to specify causality in action theories, and 
show how our approach provides some new insights for solving the ramification and 
qualification problems by combining causal relations into action theories. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines causal relations and causal 
theories formally, and uses Lukaszewicz’s default model theory to provide formal se- 
mantics for causal theories. Section 3 proposes a new principle for reasoning about 
action called the causality-based minimal change principle. A formulation of actions 
based on this principle is presented. Section 4 illustrates further examples to show the 
application of our method in reasoning about action. Section 5 extends our approach 
to deal with sequence of actions. Section 6 compares our method with related work 
in detail. Section 7 describes a logic programming approximation to compute causal 
theories of actions that provides an implementational basis for our method. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes the paper with some remarks. 
2. Semantics for causal theories 
Let 9 be a finite propositional language with two additional symbols w and + 
which we will use to express causal relations. A causal relation is any expression of 
the form A -+ B or A + B, where A and B are propositional formulas of 9. Specifi- 
cally, an expression A-+ B is read “the fact that A normally causes the fact that B”, 
while an expression A + B is read “the fact that A causes the fact that B”. For both 
cases, we will call A is a cause of A-+B (or A + B) or B is an effect of A-+B 
(or A =+ B). 
The above two forms of expressions A -yy) B and A + B represent defeasible and 
non-defeasible causal relations respectively in our problem domain. For example, con- 
sider a causal relation which says that “the fact that a match has been struck normally 
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causes the fact that it has lit”. However, if the match is wet and we know that striking 
a wet match normally does not light, then this causal relation should not be triggered 
during our reasoning. So this causal relation is defeasible. On the other hand, a state- 
ment that “the fact that some one is dead causes the fact that this person is not walking” 
should not be defeasible from our commonsense. 
A causal theory CT is defined as a pair (JY, %‘), where G? is a set of propositional 
formulas of 3 and V a set of causal relations. Note that $5’ includes both forms of 
causal relations as we described earlier. To simplify our formulation, we restrict both 
d and % to be finite. Intuitively, a causal theory represents knowledge about a domain 
while & is viewed as basic facts or/and constraints of the domain, and %? represents 
the causality about this domain. 
Now we try to provide a model theoretic semantics for the causal theory. In fact, 
we can treat our causal relations as defaults in Reiter’s default logic [ 171 under the 
propositional case. In particular, a defeasible causal relation A -in* B can be viewed as 
a normal default A : B/B, while a non-defeasible causal relation A + B is viewed as 
a default A :/B (i.e. a default without justification). Therefore, a causal relation like 
heavy-rainfall M* jloods can be also interpreted as “if there is a heavy rainfall and it 
is consistent to believe that there are floods, then one may believe that there are floods 
caused by a heavy rainfall”. Hence, in our formalism, causal reasoning turns out to be 
a kind of default reasoning, and a causal theory corresponds to a propositional default 
theory [ 171. 
Treating causal theories as propositional default theories, we then can use the default 
model theory originally proposed by Etherington and extended by tukaszewicz [12] to 
provide formal semantics for our causal theories. 
Let CD be a class of interpretations of language 9 and A a propositional formula. 
@(A) = {‘p 1 cp E @ and cp /= A}. @ is called elementary iff @ is the class of all models 
of some set of propositional formulas 9. 
Definition 1. Let @ be a class of interpretations of language _Y and Il a set of propo- 
sitional formulas. The pair (CD, n) is called a structure iff 
(i) @ is elementary; 
(ii) For every AE Ii’, @(A)#& 
Intuitively, a structure (@, n) is interpreted as a class of all models of some belief 
set (i.e. @) and a set of justifications (i.e. ZI) for these beliefs that are consistent with 
these beliefs. 
Definition 2. Let @ be an elementary class of interpretations of language 9 and 
c = A -+ B or c = A + B be a causal relation. We say that c is applicable with respect 
to @ iff 
(i) cp + A for every cp E @; 
(ii) If c=A-+B, there is some qp~@ such that q/=B. 
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Definition 3. Let (@,ZI) be a structure. The characteristic function fc of a causal 
relation c = A -+ B or c = A + B with respect to (@, Ii’) is defined as follows: 
(Q(B), II U {B}) if c = A-+ B and is applicable 
with respect to @, 
if c = A + B and is applicable 
with respect to @‘, 
if c is not applicable 
with respect to @. 
Note that a characteristic function fc changes a structure (@,II) to another pair 
(@‘, Ii”), which may or may not be a structure, by applying causal relation c as shown 
in the definition. The following definition 
obvious way. 
Definition 4. Let (@, Ii’) be a structure and 
that (CD, II) is stable with respect to V iff 
.A4 (@‘, n) > = (@, m 
Definition 5. Let (@, ZI) 
f(,,,((@,IT)) we denote: 
for all c E %?. 
defines the stability of a structure in an 
let V be a set of causal relations. We say 
be a structure and (ci) a sequence of causal relations. By 
f(c,,((@JD= 
(@, n) if (ci) = ( ) (the empty sequence) 
(n@i, UIIi) otherwise, 
where (@s,IIa)=(@,II), and for i=O,l,... 
(@i+l, fli+l) = .L,((@i, ni) 1. 
Definition 6. Let (~3, II) be a structure, Y be an elementary class of interpretations 
of language 9. Suppose (ci) is a sequence of causal relations. We say that (@,IZ) is 
flC8, -accessible from Y iff (@, IZ) = fcCZ, (( Y, 0) ). We say that (CD, II) is accessible from 
Y with respect to %? iff there is a sequence (possible empty) (ci) of causal relations 
from %? such that (Cp, II) is f(,)-accessible from Y. 
Now we are ready to give the definition of the class of models of a causal theory. A 
detailed explanation of the following definition is referred to Lukaszewicz’s work [12]. 
Definition 7. Let CT = (~2, %) be a causal theory, Mod(d) the class of all models of 
d, and 0 the set of all subclasses of Mod(&) such that for each @ E 0, there exists 
a set of propositional formulas IZ satisfying 
(i) (@, II) is a structure; 
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(ii) (@,IZ) is stable with respect to %?; 
(iii) (@,LI) is accessible from Mod(&) with respect to %‘. 
Then, the class of all models of CT, denoted as Mod(CT), is defined as 
Mod(CT) = u @. 
GE@ 
Here we present some intuitions behind the above definition. Recall that our causal 
theory (6,%‘) is a special form of Reiter’s default theory. As Lukaszewicz showed 
in [12], each @ in 0 above actually is a class of all models of some extension of 
the corresponding default theory. Hence, lJQEo @ is the class of all models of all 
extensions of the corresponding default theory. We then specify this class to be the 
class of all models of our causal theory. 
Example 1. Consider a causal theory 
CT = ({ +oods}, {heauy-rainfaZl-+jIoods)). 
Obviously, (Mod( { +oods} ), 0) is a structure. Further, it is easy to see that (Mud( {- 
jIoo&}), 0) is stable with respect to causal relation heavy-rainfall -+ joods. Therefore, 
from Definition 7, it follows that 
Mod( CT) = Mod( { +oods}). 
Example 2. Consider a causal theory 
CT = ({bfocked(ductl), blocked(ductl)}, 
{blocked(ductl) A blocked(duct2) +stufly(room))). 
Since blocked(ductl ) A bZocked(ductz) + stufSy(room) is applicable with respect to 
Mod({bZocked(ductl), bZocked(ductz)}), it is easy to see that ({bZocked(ductl), 
bZocked(ductz), stz&y(room)}, 0) is the only stable and accessible structure from 
Mod({bZocked(ductl), bZocked(ductz)}) with respect to the causal relation. So we 
have the following solution: 
Mod(CT) = {{bZocked(ductl), bZocked(duct;!), stufSy(room)}}. 
Example 3. Consider a causal theory 
CT = ({ bird( tweety), brokenwing( tweety)}, 
{ bird( tweety) +$y( tweety), 
brokenwing(tweety) + -fZy(tweety)}). 
Ignoring the detail, this causal theory has a unique model: 
(bird(tweety), brokenwing(tweety),l$y(tweety)}. 
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Example 4. Consider a causal theory 
CT = ({smoke, sport}, {smoke-+ lhealth, sport yv* health}). 
It is not difficult to see that there are two structures, 
({smoke, sport, -health}, { lhealth}), 
and 
({smoke, sport, health}, {health}), 
which are stable and accessible from (Mod({ smoke, sport}), 0) with respect to causal 
relations smoke-* lhealth and sport -+ health. Hence models of this causal theory are 
(smoke, sport, Thealth), 
and 
{smoke, sport, health}. 
If we replace causal relations smoke -+ Thealth and sport -+ health by smoke + Thealth 
and sport + health respectively, it is clear that the new causal theory does not have a 
model according to Definition 7. 
3. A causality-based minimal change approach 
3.1. Preliminaries 
In this section we propose a formulation of actions in which a causality-based min- 
imal change principle is employed. To begin with, we first introduce some useful 
notations and concepts. We use an interpretation S of the language 2’ to represent 
the state of the world. We assume that there is a set of propositional formulas $3 to 
represent domain constraints about the world, which should be satisfied by each state 
of the world, i.e. S + 9. 
We also consider a set of causal relations %? to represent the causality of the domain 
while a causal relation in Q? is expressed as A -+ B or A =+ B as described in last section. 
Let c : A -+ B or A + B be a causal relation. A state S is called c-consistent if and only 
if S + A implies S b B. S is called %-consistent if and only if for each c E 59, S is 
c-consistent. We assume that every initial state is %?-consistent before any actions are 
performed on it. However, as it will be shown later, the resulting state may not be 
%?-consistent after some action is performed on the initial state. 
An action act is specified by a post-condition Post(act), where Post(act) is a propo- 
sitional formula and represents the direct effect of act. Informally, action act changes 
the state of the world from one to another, and in the resulting state Post(act) is 
satisfied. Note that here we do not specify the pre-condition of action act in the sense 
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that the executability of an action on a state can be derived from our approach. This 
is the so-called derived qualification [13] that will be addressed in Sections 4 and 6. 
Let St and S, be two interpretations. We say that Si and Sz dt@r on a propositional 
letter p if p appears in exactly one of Sr and SZ. Dzj-(Sl, &) denotes the set of all 
different propositional letters between St and SZ. Let S be an interpretation, Y be a 
set of interpretations. We define the set of all minimal deferent interpretations of Y 
with respect to S as follows: 
Min(S, Y) = {S’ 1 S’ E Y, and there does not exist other S” E Y 
such that Dzf(S, S”) c Dzg(S, S’)}. 
Let S be an initial state, act an action and 9 a set of domain constraints. Then the 
PMA [ 181 defines the set of possible resulting states as follows: 
Re,?(S,act) = Min(SMod(9 U {Post(act)})). 
3.2. The approach 
Taking causality into account, we need to consider indirect effects of actions which 
are related to causal relations of the domain. As was showed in Section 1, the traditional 
minimal change approach, in which only logical constraints are considered, cannot rep- 
resent these action effects properly. Here we propose a causality-based minimal change 
principle. The basic idea is: during a state transition, the minimal change principle is 
applied generally but with exception on the causally indirect effects of actions. For 
instance, in the simplified stuffy room example, suppose that we replace constraint (1) 
with a causal relation 
blocked(ductl ) A blocked(duct2) + stufSv(room), 
and the current state is 
(3) 
S = {TbZocked(ductl ), blocked(ductz), lstufSv(room)}. (4) 
If an action of making duct, blocked, i.e. the post-condition is blocked(ductl), is 
performed on S, and there is no other domain constraint, intuitively, we would expect 
the resulting state to be 
S’ = {blocked(ductl), bZocked(ductz), stufy(room)}. 
To derive this intuitive resulting state from S, we may use the minimal change principle 
on literal blocked(duct2) but with exception on literal lstufSv(room). 
The reason is that since blocked(duct2) is consistent with the direct effect blocked 
(ductl) of the action, according to the minimal change principle, blocked(duct2) should 
persist during the state change. On the other hand, because of causal relation (3), 
we know that from blocked(ductl) and blocked(duct2), we should causally derive 
stufSy(room). That is, stufy(room) is an causally indirect effect of this action. So, the 
minimal change principle should not apply to literal lstufSy(room). Now, we are ready 
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to formalize the idea described above. The following two definitions give the formal 
description of the causality-based minimal change approach. 
Definition 8. Let %7 and 9 be the sets of causal relations and constraints of the domain, 
respectively, S a state of the world, and act an action. Let 6 be a maximal subset of 
S such that 
( 1) 9 U { Post(act)} U 6 is consistent, 
(2) for any A-B or A+B in V, hplB, 
(3) let 6 = 0 if there does not exist a 6 satisfying conditions 1 and 2 above. 
The set of all such maximal subsets of S is denoted as Max(S,act). 
Definition 9. Let %‘, 9, S, act, 6 and Max(S,act) be defined as above. A causal 
theory CT<: is specified as follows: 
CT;? = (&‘, U), where d = 9 U {Post(act)} U 6, and 6 E Max(S, act). 
Then the set of all possible resulting states from performing act on S, Res’,“(S,act), 
is defined as 
Resw,9(S, act) = U M&S, Mod(CT,q$)). (5) 
GEMax(S,acr) 
Let us examine the above two definitions more closely. In Definition 8, 6 is the 
maximal subset of S with respect to action act such that (i) 6 is consistent with 
domain constraints 9 and the direct effect of action act{Post(act)}, and (ii) 6 is also 
consistent with the effect of each causal relation in %‘, or (iii) 6 = 0 if there is no such 
6 satisfying (i) and (ii). Obviously, condition (i) is the basic requirement for a state 
change. Condition (ii) means that those facts in 6 together with 9 and {Post(act)} 
may causally derive some causal effects according to causal relations in W. In this case, 
if negations of these causal effects are entailed by S, they should be changed after this 
action. To make such causal reasoning successfully, it is necessary to require that 6 
be consistent with the effect B of any causal relation A -+ B or A + B in W. 
It may be argued that Condition 2 in Definition 8 is too conservative since it might 
be the case that for some A -+ B or A + B in %?, S k A and B may not be causally 
derived. For instance, suppose S = {1A, TB, C}, V = {A--P B} (or G?? = {A + B}) and 
Post(act)s -C. In this case, 6= {-A}. However, note that this will not affect the 
persistence of 1B as the minimal change will guarantee this as Definition 9 states. 
It should be also noted that Condition 3 in Definition 8 is necessary because in 
some situations, there is no 6 satisfying conditions 1 and 2. For example, consider a 
situation that we have a causal relation A + False, domain constraint 9 = 0, an initial 
state S = (1A) and an action’s post-condition 1A. Intuitively, this action does not 
change S so the resulting state should be still S. However, as the effect of the causal 
relation is False, there is no 6 satisfying conditions 1 and 2. In this case, Condition 3 
ensures that a background knowledge JZZ about the domain with respect to the action, 
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which is needed in the causal theory CT!: defined in Definition 9, can be still formed 
by assigning 6 = 0. 
Now consider the stuffy room example again where 9 = 0, VZ consists of a sin- 
gle causal relation (3), and the initial state S is (4). The direct effect of action of 
making duct1 blocked is bZocked(ductl). According to the above definition, we have 
6 = { bZocked(duct2)}. Note that ~stz&y(room) is not included in 6 since 6 needs to 
be consistent with stz&y(room). Therefore, from {bZocked(ductl )} U 6 together with 
causal relation (3), we may derive a causal effect stufSy(room). 
The derivation of causally indirect effects of act with respect to V is achieved by 
specifying a causal theory CT{? in Definition 9 and obtaining all models Mod(CT{f ) 
of CT;%! Then we specify the set of final possible resulting states to be the union of 
those models in Mod(CT{“g) for any 6 E Mux(S, act), such that models in Mod(CTt$) 
have minimal differences with the the initial state S (i.e. (5)). 
Continue considering the stuffy room example presented above. From Definition 8, 
Mux(S,act) = (6) = {{bZocked(duct~)}}, and from Definition 9, we have 
CT<? = ({bZocked(ductl),bZocked(ductz)}, {(3)}), and 
Res’,g(S, act) = Min(S, Mod(CT<CB)) 
= {{bZocked(ductl), bZocked(duct~),stz&y(room)}}, 
which gives the desired solution as we expect. 
It is easy to see that if the set of causal relations is empty, our approach described 
above reduces to the PMA, as the following theorem states. 
Theorem 1. Res’(S,act)=ResBp9(S,uct). 
Proof. We first prove Res”(S, act) 2 ResO’B (S, act). Let S’ E Resg(S, act). From the 
definition of Re?(S, act), we have S’ E Mod(9 U {Post(uct)}) and for any S” E Mod 
(9 U {Post(uct)}), Difs(S,S”) $ D@(S,S’). This follows that SnS’ is a maximal 
subset of S such that 9 U {Post(uct)} US n S’ is consistent. So S n S’ E Mux(S, act). 
Let 6 = S nS’. That is, S’ E Mod(9 U {Post(uct)} U 6). Since Mod(9 U {Post(act)} U 
6) 5 Mod(9 U {Post(uct)}) and for any S” E Mod(9 U {Post(uct)}), Difs(S,S”) Qt 
Difs(S, S’), it follows that for any S” E Mod(9 u {Post(uct)} u d), Disf(S,S”) q‘ Dig 
(S,S’). So S’ E Min(S, Mod(9 U {Post(uct)} U 6)). That is, S’ E ResO,a(S,uct) from 
Definition 9 (note that since %? = 0, Mod(CT{qCg) = Mod(9 U {Post(uct)) U 6)). 
Now we prove Res”,’ (S, act) C Res9(S, act). Let S’ E Res ““(S, act). Therefore, there 
exists some 6 E Mux(S,uct) and S’ E Min(S, Mod(9 U {Post(uct)} U 6)). Hence, for 
any S” E Mod(9 U {Post(uct)} U d), Dzf(S, S”) < Dzjj-(S, S’). Clearly, S’ is also in 
Mod(9 U {Post(uct)}). We need to show that for any S” E Mod(9 U {Post(uct)}), 
Dzj”(S, S”) @ Dijj-(S, S’). 
Firstly, it is obvious that 6 = S n S’ since 6 c S n S’ and from the maximum of 6 we 
have SnS’G6. 
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Suppose that there is some S” E Mod(9 U {Post(act)}) such that Difl(S, S”) c Diff 
(S, S’). That is S n S’ c S fl S”. But as 6 = S fl S’ E Max(S, uct), this is contradictory. 
So for any S” E M&(9 U {Post(act)}), Dzjj‘-(S, S”) Q Difs(S, S’), which means S’ E 
ReP(S, act). 0 
4. Further examples 
In this section, we discuss more examples to show how the approach described 
previously represents causal effects of actions properly. 
Example 5. Consider a baby room domain. In this domain, 9 consists of the following 
constraints: 
ontuble( cup) 3 sufe( cup), (f-9 
ontable(doZl) 3 sufe(dolZ). (7) 
Intuitively, (6) and (7) say that both the cup and doll on the table are safe to the baby. 
This domain reveals a problem so-called the persistence of derived information first 
examined by Myers and Smith [ 151. Specifically, sufe( cup) (and sufe(doll)) is derived 
information from ontubZe(cup) (and ontabZe(doEE) respectively). But there are different 
requirements for the persistence of safe(czlp) and safe(doll) with respect to the change 
of ontuble(cup) and ontubZe(doZZ) respectively. For example, consider an initial state 
while both the cup and doll are on the table (i.e. ontabZe(cup) and ontable(doll)), and 
from (6) and (7) this follows that both the cup and doll are safe to the baby (i.e. 
sufe(cup) and sufe(dolZ)). According to the minimal change principle, removing the 
cup or doll from the table will not affect the persistence of sufe(cup) and sufe(dolZ) 
respectively. However, from our commonsense on the other hand, removing the cup 
from the table (eg. put the cup on the floor) may cause it to be no longer safe to the 
baby, while removing the doll from the table should not affect the doll’s safety to the 
baby. 
This problem can be avoided with our approach if we specify a causal relation (i.e. 
W consists of just one causal relation) in the domain: 
-ontabZe(cup)+ 3afe(cup). (8) 
Formally, let the initial state be: 
S = {ontable(cup), ontuble(doll), sufe(cup), sufe(dol1)). 
Suppose action act1 of removing the cup from the table (i.e. Post(uctl) G -ontabZe 
(cup)) is performed on S. To predict the possible resulting state, we use the approach 
presented in Section 3. According to Definition 8, it is not difficult to see that 
Mux(S, uctl) = (61) = {{ontubZe(doZl), sufe(doZZ)}}. 
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Then we have a causal theory as follows: 
CT?;,’ = (I(6), (7)) U {~ontobZe(c~)} u 4, ((8))). 
The set of models of CTP;,’ is 
Mod(CT~~~)={cpl}, where 
cpi = {~ontabZe(cup), ontubZe(doZZ), -~fe(cup), sufe(doZZ)}. 
Finally, from (5) in Definition 9, we have the possible resulting state as follows: 
which represents our intuitive solution - after removing the cup from the table, it is 
no longer safe to the baby. 
Now consider that still at the same initial state S, another action act2 of removing 
the doll from the table (i.e. Post(actz) E ~ontubZe(doZ2)) is performed on S. Similarly, 
we have 
Mux(S,uct2)= (62) = {{ontubZe(cz4p),sufe(cup),sufe(doZZ)}. 
Ignoring the detail, we finally get the possible resulting state as follows: 
ResvgB(S,uct2) = {(pz}, where 
402 = {ontabZe(cup), 7ontubZe(doZZ), sufe(cup), sufe(doZZ)}, 
which also gives the intuitive solution - removing the doll from the table does not 
affect its safety to the baby. 
Example 6. From our commonsense, we know that if a baby is awake, he/she normally 
is not quiet. But if the baby is cuddled by his/her mother, he/she normally is quiet. 
These can be described by the following causal relations respectively: 
bubyuwuke -iru* Tquiet, (9) 
babycuddled -+ quiet. (10) 
Suppose currently the baby is awake and is not cuddled by mother and then he/she is 
crying. Hence the initial state is 
S = {babyawake, lquiet, Tbubycuddled}. 
Now assume that the mother cuddles the baby. Our question is: Is the baby quiet after 
cuddled by his/her mother? Obviously, using our method presented in Section 3, we 
have two possible resulting states 
Si = {bubyuwuke, lquiet, babycuddled}, and 
S2 = (babyawake, quiet, babycuddled), 
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which seem reasonable as both babyawake and babycuddled being true leads to two 
possible statuses of the baby’s quietness according to causal relations (9) and (lo), 
respectively. 
Example 7. The light-power domain. Consider a domain with two causal relations as 
following respectively: 
on -+ light, (11) 
Ton v Ipower + 4ght. (12) 
Intuitively, (11) says that the fact that switch is on normally causes the fact that the 
lamp lights, while (12) says that the fact that the switch is off or there is no power will 
cause the fact that the lamp can not light. For causal relation (1 1 ), people may think 
that a precise causal relation should be on A power -+ light. But we argue that a more 
precise one can be on Apower A -broken-lamp A circuit-ok A . . . - light. Since (11) is 
a defeasible causal relation, it is sufficient to represent (11) in our domain. It is also 
important to note that causal relation (12) is not defeasible in the sense that the fact 
that the switch is off or there is no power will definitely cause the fact that the lamp 
can not light. 
Now suppose the initial state Si = {Eight, on, power}. Consider an action of cut- 
ting off the power (i.e. Post(actl) E lpower) is performed on Si. Obviously using 
our method presented in Section 3, we have a unique resulting state S’ = {Tlight, 
on, Tpower}. On the other hand, suppose the initial state 5’2 = {‘Eight, Ton, lpower} 
and an action of turning on the switch (i.e. Post(act2) E on) is performed on S2. Clearly, 
there is also a unique resulting state S” = {Ilight, on, lpower}. Note that the resulting 
state is not consistent with respect to causal relation on 4 light. 
Example 8. Consider a domain with a causal relation: 
Talive + Twalking, (13) 
which says that the fact that some one is not alive causes the fact that he/she is not 
walking. Suppose the initial state S = {lalive, lwalking} to represent that Fred is not 
alive and he is not walking. Assume that an action act with the postcondition walking 
is intended to perform on S. Using our method, we will get Res{(13)),0(S,act) = 0, 
that means that the action act can not be performed on S. Intuitively, this solution 
is reasonable from our commonsense that if Fred is not alive then he can not walk 
any more. Technically, this result is achieved by specifying causal relation (13) as a 
non-defeasible rule. This is also an example of a derived qualification. 
5. Representing action sequences 
It is straightforward to generalize our approach presented in Section 3 to the case 
of a sequence of actions. Formally, let 2 be an action sequence act1 . act2 . . . act, 
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and act,+1 an action, we denote A . act,+] = act1 . act2 . ’ . act, . act,,+l. An empty action 
sequence is denoted as E. Suppose S is the initial state in which 2 starts to be executed 
sequentially. Then the set of possible states resulting from performing action sequence 2 
on S sequentially, R~.Y’,~(S,~), is defined as follows: 
Let us consider the light-power domain described in Example 7 again, where w = (( 1 1 ), 
(12)) and 9 = 0. Suppose the initial state is 
S = { Tlight, Ton, power}, 
and three actions of turning on the switch (Post(actl) E on), cutting off the power 
(Post(act2) E lpower), and providing power (Post(act3) E power) are sequentially 
performed on S. According to the definition of Res’,g(S,i), we have the following 
results: 
Resq3g(S, act1 ) = {{light, on, power}}, 
ResW39(S, act1 . act2) = {{-light, on, ‘power}}, and 
Res’,‘(S, act] . act2 . acq) = {{light, on, power}}. 
6. Comparisons with related work 
The idea of introducing causal connections into action theories is not new. Hayes’ 
work on the logic of actions [7] probably was the first formalization of considering 
domain causality in an action theory. Some other researchers have also used the notion 
of causality to formalize the effects of actions (e.g. [9]). However, as pointed by 
Lin [ 111, most of them only considered the direct effects caused by actions. So their 
approaches did not represent the indirect effects of actions properly. Recently, Brewka 
and Hertzberg [2], McCain and Turner [ 131 and Lin [ 1 l] have independently proposed 
new theories of actions in which the domain causality was explicitly taken into account. 
In this section, we will specifically compare our approach with McCain and Turner’s 
and Brewka and Hertzberg’s approaches. We will also briefly discuss Lin’s method. 
6.1. McCain and Turner’s approach 
In McCain and Turner’s method, a causal relation is presented as an (non-defeasible) 
inference rule. For instance, expression A+ B indicates a causal relation between 
propositional formulas A and B, eg. the statement that Fred not being alive causes 
Fred not being walking can be expressed as Talive + lwalking, which has the same 
form of the non-defeasible causal relation in our approach. Let %? be a set of such causal 
laws, r a set of propositional formulas. r is closed under V if for every A + B E %, if 
A E r then B E r. For any formula A, r kq A denotes that A belongs to the smallest set 
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of formulas containing r that is closed with respect to propositional logic and closed 
under %?, Then the set of possible states resulting from the performance of action act 
on the initial state S, Res’(S,act), is specified to be the set of interpretations such that 
Res’(S,act) = {S’ 1 S’ = (11 (S fl S') U {Post(act)} EqZ}}, (14) 
where I is a propositional literal. 
Note that in McCain and Turner’s method, the possible resulting states are defined 
by satisfying a fixpoint condition with respect to the inference relation Fu. To illustrate 
the difference between McCain and Turner’s method and ours, let us first consider the 
following example. 
Example 9. The light-power domain revisited. Let us reconsider Example 7 within 
McCain and Turner’s formalism. As all causal relations in their formalism are repre- 
sented as (non-defeasible) inference rules, the causal relation (11) needs to be 
represented as 
on + light. (15) 
Therefore, the set of causal relations of the light-power domain here is %3 = {( 12), (15)). 
Suppose that the initial state Si = {light, on, power}, and the action of cutting off the 
power (i.e. Post(actl) G -power) is performed on Si. From (14), we have the re- 
sult Res’(Sk, act1 ) = 0, i.e. the action of cutting off the power can not occur. On the 
other hand, if the initial state S2 = {llight, Ton, lpower} and the action of tum- 
ing on the switch (i.e. Post(act2) - on) is performed on SZ. Similarly, we still have 
Res*(S,, act2) = 0. 
Now we argue that both solutions above seem not quite reasonable from our intuition. 
For instance, it is necessary for a security robot to be able to cut off the power for the 
safety if there is a fire alarm. Similarly, no matter if there is power, the action of turning 
on the switch should be executable usually. From this sense, McCain and Turner’s 
method is quite restricted. In order to obtain the desired solutions as described in 
Example 7, within McCain and Turner’s formalism, we have to rewrite causal relation 
(15) to the following form 
on A power + light. (16) 
However, as we mentioned in Example 7, it is always arguable that a more precise 
causal relation can be obtained by adding more causes in (16) like on A power A 
Tbroken-lamp + light and so on. Obviously, this is not always practicable to represent 
causal relations. 0 
From the above example, we can see that distinguishing causal relations as defeasible 
and non-defeasible seems more natural and flexible than just representing them as 
unified non-defeasible inference rules. In fact, the following result shows that McCain 
and Turner’s method can be treated as a special case in our system. 
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Theorem 2. Let W be a set of causal relations in which every causal relation has the 
form A + B, S a state, and act an action. Then Res*(S, act) = Res’,“(S, act). 
Proof. We first prove Res’(S, act) 2 ResW>O(S,act). If ResW(S, act) = 0, then the re- 
sult holds. NOW suppose Res’(S, act) # 8. For any S’ E Res”(S, act), S’ = { 11 (S n S’) u 
{Post(act)} Fq I}, this follows that S’ is the interpretation such that 
(i) S’ + Post(act), 
(ii) S’ is %-consistent, and 
(iii) for any other interpretation S” satisfying (i) and (ii), S n S’ @ S n S”. 
This is because that if there exists some S” satisfying (i), (ii) and S rl S’ c S n S”, we 
will have { 11 (S n S’) U {Post(act)} tq 1) c { 11 (S n S”) U {Post(act)} tQ 1). But S’ is 
an interpretation and S’ = { 11 (S n S’) U {Post(act)} tq 1). So it is contradictory. 
Since S’ satisfies conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), it follows that SnS’ is the maximal 
subset of S such that {Post(act)} US n S’ is consistent and S nS’ is %?-consistent. 
Therefore, there exists some 6 E Max(S, act) such that 6 C: S n S’. Let d = {Post(act)} 
U 6. Then S’ E Mod(&). We specify a causal theory CTrj = (&‘, %). From Definition 
3-7, it is easy to see that S’ E Mod(CT$). Since from Definition 3 and Definition 7, 
if S’ ~Mod(&) but S’ $Mod(CTyg), then there must be some A + B in w such that 
S’ b A and S’ k B. This is contradictory to S’s V-consistency. 
We then need to show S’ E Min(S,Mod(CTFsf)) according to Definition 9. Assume 
that S’ $Min(S,Mod(CT~~)). It means that there exists some S” l Mod(cT$) such 
that Difs(S, S”) c Difs(S, S’), which leads to S n S’ c S n S”. Since S” /= Post(act) and 
S” is +Y-consistent, it turns out that S’ does not satisfy conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) 
presented above, and obviously this is contradictory. 
Now we prove Res ‘,O(S act) & ResW(S, act). Obviously if Res’,O(S, act) = 0, then 
the result holds. Suppose ies’,O(S,act) # 0. For any S’ E ResW,O(S,act), there exists 
some 6 E Max(S, act) such that 6 G S n S’ and S’ E Mod(CTrj)), where CT?,’ = (&, U) 
and JZZ = {Post(act)} U 6. Therefore, we have {I 16 U {Post(act)} Fq 1) C ?. Further- 
more, since S’ E Min(S,Mod(CT$)) and then Dz~(S,S”) @ Difs(S,S’) for any S” in 
Mod(CT,4C,‘), S’-{ I 16 U {Post(act)} FW 1) & S n S’. So we have S’= { 116 U {Post(act)} 
FW 1) US n S’. On the other hand, as 6 & S n S’, we have { 1 I 6 U {Post(act)} ty 1) c 
{ 11 S n S’ u {Post(act)} ta 1). So S’ = { 1 I 6 u {Post(act)} Fq 1) u S n S’ & { 1 I S n S’ u 
{Post(act)} tq 1) US n S’ = { 1 I S n S’ U {Post(act)} tq 1). That is: S’ & { 1 I S n S’ u 
{Post(act)} I-W I}. As S ’ is an interpretation, we have S’= (I j S n S’U {Post(act)) tq l}, 
and hence S’ E Res’(S, act). q 
6.2. Brewka and Hertzberg’s approach 
Brewka and Hertzberg proposed an approach to deal with the problem of reasoning 
about actions with causal and disjunctive effects [2]. In their approach, like McCain 
and Turner’s method, causal relations are explicitly represented as some inference rules. 
The difference between Brewka and Hertzberg’s approach and McCain and Turner’s 
is that Brewka and Hertzberg also considered general logical constraints as parts of 
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background knowledge of the domain. In the rest of this section, we will first review 
Brewka and Hertzberg’s method and then discuss the problem of their approach by 
illustrating a simple example. To keep our discussion to be consistent with our previous 
descriptions, we will slightly modify Brewka and Hertzberg’s formulation. 
Let Gf: be a set of causal relations in which each causal relation has the form A +B 
(A and B are propositional formulas), and 9 a set of propositional formulas to represent 
the set of domain constraints. A background knowledge K of the domain is defined as 
K = Theory(%) U 9, where Theory(%) = {A > B j A + B E %}. Every model in Mod(K) 
is called a possible world of K. The %-closure of some set of formulas H is the smallest 
deductively closed set that is also closed under the rules in 59. We denote H t-q f if 
f is in the %-closure of H. If F is a set of formulas in which each element of F is 
in the V-closure of H, we denote H ka F. 
Given two possible worlds Si and &. DisfsH(St,Sz) denotes the set of literals true in 
S2 but not in St. We should mention that DifsBH(SI,&) is different from Dif(Sl,&) 
defined in Section 3. A set of literals P is called a causal change set of (St,&) 
if and only if P is a minimal subset of Diff&Sl,&) such that P U (Sl fl$)t--, 5’; 
and Si U 9 I- S2 for some Si C S2. Intuitively, a causal change set is a minimal set of 
changes that transforms St to S2, given the background knowledge K. The remaining 
changes between St and S2 are caused by the causal change set with respect to V and 
also forced by the constraint 9. 
Suppose S, St and S2 are possible worlds. St is called closer to S than S2, denoted 
as St +s S2, if and only if (i) Dzr&S,Si) c DifsBH(S, SZ), or (ii) every causal change 
set of (S,Si) is a subset of a causal change set of (S,&), and not vice versa. 
Based on the above definitions, the possible world S’ resulting from S by perform- 
ing action act on S is defined as follows: S’ is +-minimal among the worlds in 
Mod(K) satisfying Post(act). The set of all possible resulting worlds is denoted as 
ResI$(S,act). 
The intuitive idea of Brewka and Hertzberg’s formalization is quite clear: a combina- 
tion of the traditional minimal change principle on models (i.e. condition (i) described 
above) and a minimal causal change principle (i.e. condition (ii) above) is used in rea- 
soning about action. Unfortunately, as it will be shown next, Brewka and Hertzberg’s 
minimal causal change principle is actually not appropriate to capture causal effects of 
actions if mutual eficts between causal relations and domain constraints are involved 
in the reasoning. 
Example 10. Consider a domain consisting of two causal relations 
on1 A on2 + light, 
bright(room) =+ visible(painting), (18) 
(17) 
and a single logical constraint 
light > bright(room). (19) 
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Intuitively, (17) says that if two switches are on, then the lamp will light, and (18) 
says that if the room is bright, then the painting hung on the wall is visible, while 
constraint (19) simply states that the fact that lamp is lighting implies the fact that the 
room is bright. Note that we do not specify (19) as a causal relation since formula 
4~right(room) > 4ight is also true from our commonsense. Now suppose the initial 
state is 
S = (-&right(room), -light, ~onl,on2, wisible(painting)} 
and an action act of turning on the first switch is performed on S (i.e. Post(act) E onl). 
Since K = Theory({( 17), (18)) U {( 19)}, there are six possible worlds of K satisfying 
Post(act) E on1 as follows: 
S1 = {bright(room), light, onl, on2, visibZe(painting)}, 
S2 = {lbright(room), -light, onl, lon2, ~visible(painting)}, 
S3 = {lbright(room), dight, onl, lon2, visibZe(painting)}, 
Sd = { lbright(room), llight, onl, lon2, wisible(painting)}, 
Ss = {bright(room), dight, onl, 70122, visibZe(painting)}, 
S,5 = {bright(room), light, onl, Ton2, visible(painting)}. 
From the definition of causal change set presented above, it is not difficult to see that 
Difs&(S, S1 ) @ Diff&S, SZ), and both PI = { onl, visible(room)} C D@&S, & ) and 
P2 = {onl, ~on2) C DiflBH(S,S2) are two minimal causal change sets, and therefore 
both Si and S2 are +-minimal. So we have 
Clearly Si is our desired result. But it is surprising that the unintuitive world S2 is also 
a possible solution. 0 
From the above example, we can see that Brewka and Hertzberg’s approach still 
suffers from the difficulty of deriving indirect effects of actions originally pointed by 
Lifschitz [lo], even if the causality was introduced in their formulation. In fact, the 
major problem of their formulation is that the definition of causal change set does not 
capture their intuition of minimal causal change principle properly. For instance, they 
did not consider the possibility of mutual effects occurring between causal relations 
and logical constraints. In Example 10, when literal TonI is changed to onl, causal 
relation (17) is triggered and this causes literal light to be true. Then constraint (19) 
should be applied to derive bright(room). After that, the second causal relation (18) 
is triggered to derive literal visibZe(painting). Clearly, the definition of causal change 
set only covers the first two steps and misses the last step. 
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On the other hand, if we use our approach described in Section 3 to deal with 
Example 10, it is not difficult to see that the unique desired possible solution Si can 
be derived, where both causal relations (17) and (18) are still non-defeasible in our 
formalism. 
6.3. Lin’s approach 
Differently from McCain and Turner’s, Brewka and Hertzberg’s and our approaches, 
Lin considered the causality problem within the situation calculus framework [14], 
where causality was treated as a predicate called Caused [ 111. For instance, the formula 
blocked(ductl,s) A blocked(duct2,s) > Caused(stuffy, true,s) 
represents a causal rule saying that if duct, is blocked and duct2 is blocked, then it 
will cause the fluent stufSY to be true. The essential principle employed in Lin’s for- 
malization for specifying the effects of actions is that “anything changed during a state 
transition must be caused”. It means that any change must be related to some causal 
rules in the causal theory. To derive the indirect effects of actions, a circumscription 
mechanism is used to minimize predicate Caused in the causal theory. 
Although Lin’s approach is quite different superficially from ours, the basic motiva- 
tions are similar. Both methods use the minimization idea to specify the state change, 
and in order to derive the causal effects of actions, both methods employed some 
nonmonotonic mechanisms (e.g., circumscription and default logic respectively). How- 
ever, it is not difficult to see that a similar problem with McCain and Turner’s method 
illustrated by Example 9 also exists in Lin’s approach. At this moment, it is not clear 
yet if there exists some formal relationship between Lin’s approach and ours. 
7. A logic programming approximation 
So far, we have not addressed the implementational issue of our approach yet. It is 
obvious that to put a theory to be applicable, reasonable computational costs should 
be provided. From the construction of our approach described in Section 3, we know 
that causal theories of actions specified in Definition 9 play a central role in generating 
resulting states. Furthermore, we have also indicated that our causal theories of actions 
actually correspond to special forms of default theories. Unfortunately, it is well known 
that the computation of default theory, even for the propositional case, is intractable 
generally. 
To overcome this difficulty, in this section, we will describe a logic programming 
approximation for our approach. Specifically, we will translate a causal theory of action 
defined in Definition 9 into a corresponding extended logic program [S] so that the 
computation of the causal theory reduces to evaluate a relevant extended logic program. 
We will also show the soundness of such translation. 
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7.1. Extended logic programs: a review 
Similarly to the previous case, we restrict our discussion to the propositional case. 
A rule is a statement of the form 
LO + Ll,. . . , L,, notL,+l,. . . , notL,, (20) 
where Li (0 < i < n) is a propositional literal. LO is the head of the rule, while L1, . . . , L,, 
notL,+1,..., notLn is the body of the rule. Obviously, the body of a rule could be empty. 
The connective not represents a negation as failure. Therefore, (20) may contain two 
types of negations: classic negation 7 and negation as failure not. Informally, rule 
(20) can be interpreted as follows: if facts L1, . . . , L, are true in our current knowl- 
edge base/belief set, and facts L,+,, . . . , L, are not presented in our current knowledge 
base/belief set, then fact LO is true in our current knowledge base/belief set. 
An extended logic program li’ is a collection of rules [5]. To evaluate extended 
logic programs, Gelfond and Lifschitz defined an answer set semantics, as presented 
below. Let Zl be an extended logic program not containing not and Lit the set of all 
propositional literals in the language of II. The answer set of n, denoted as Ans(fl), 
is the smallest subset S of Lit such that 
(i) for any rule LO c LI,. . . ,L, from 17, if Ll,. . . ,L, ES, then LO ES; 
(ii) if S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S = Lit. 
Now consider ll be an extended logic program. For any subset S of Lit, let ZIs be 
the logic program obtained from 17 by deleting 
(i) each rule that has a formula not L in its body with L E S, and 
(ii) all formulas of the form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
We define that S is an answer set of II, denoted Ans(li’), iff S is an answer set of Ii”, 
i.e. S = Ans(Ii’s). Clearly, an extended logic program can have one, more than one or 
no answer sets at all. The following example shows how extended logic programs can 
be used for knowledge representation. 
Example 11. Consider an extended logic program ni consisting of the following rules: 
lquiet + babyawake, not quiet, 
quiet c babycuddled, not Tquiet, 
babyawake t , 
babycuddled c . 
According to the definition above, it is not difficult to conclude that l7, has two answer 
sets namely 
{ babyawake, babycuddled, lquiet} and 
{ babyawake, babycuddled, quiet}. 
7.2. Translating causal theory into extended logic program 
Given sets of domain constraints and causal relations 93 and V, an initial state S, an 
action act with post-condition Post(act), and A4ax(S,act) as defined in Definition 8, a 
Y. Zhang I Theoretical Computer Science 220 (1999) 489-513 509 
causal theory of action act with respect to S and 6 where 6 E Max(S, act), is specified 
as CT?: = (9 U {Post(act)} U 6,V). To derive the resulting states, we need to com- 
pute models of CT:;, i.e. Mod(CT$). In the following, we will use extended logic 
programs to present a logic programming approximation for this computation. 
Before we present the translation procedure, we need to make some assumptions. In 
causal theory CTc”g, domain constraints 9 is explicitly represented. However, as we 
can see from Section 7.1, arbitrary logic forms of constraints are clearly not expressible 
in extended logic programs. Therefore, we need to assume 9 = 8 in our translation. 
Moreover, in order to use extended logic programs to represent causal relations %?, we 
need to restrict each causal relation in GZ A + B and A -+ B to the form 
LIA ‘.. lIL,*Lo, (21) 
or 
L,A... AL,-*Lo, (22) 
where Lo,L,,... , L, are propositional literals. Finally, we restrict all actions’ post- 
conditions to have the form 
PI A ... A&, (23) 
where PI , . . . ,Pk are propositional literals. In other words, we only consider determin- 
istic actions in our translation. But we will remark in Section 8 that this restriction is 
easily released if we enhance extended logic programs by allowing disjunction occur- 
rence in the head of a rule in logic programs. 
With the above assumptions, we then can describe our translation as follows. Let 
S be a state, act an action with post-condition of the form (23), %? a set of causal 
relations with forms (21) and (22), and Max(S,act) as defined in Definition 8. For 
each 6 E hhx(S,act), we specify an extended logic program Zlzj consisting of the 
following rules: 
Action effect rules: for each Pi occurs in PI A ’ ‘. A&, specify 
Persistent fact rules: for each L E 6, specify 
L+-, 
Causal rules: for each causal relation with the form (21) and each causal relation 
with the form (22) in %‘, specify 
Lo+-L1,...,L,, 
Lo +-L,, . . . , L,,notlLo, 
respectively. 
In the program above, action effect rules represent the post-condition of the action, 
persistent fact rules, on the other hand, represent facts of S that must be persistent with 
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repsect to this action. From the intuitive semantics of causal relations described in Sec- 
tion 2, it is quite obvious to translate non-defeasible causal relation (2 1) and defeasible 
causal relation (22) into logic rules Lo +-Ll,. . . ,L, and LO tL1,. . . ,L,, not ~Lo, re- 
spectively. We call program P$i a logic program approximation of causal theory 
CT?; = ( {PI A ’ . . A Pk} U 6, U). The following result ensures that this approximation 
preserves the semantics of the original causal theory. 
Theorem 3. Let II?: be a logic program approximation of causal theory CT?: as 
defined above. Then’ (i) Mod(CT$) = 0 ifs I$$ has a unique answer set Lit or IIF: 
has no answer set; (ii) S’ E Mod(CT$) ifs there exists some answer set Ans of Ll‘$ 
such that Ans s S. 
Proof. To prove this theorem, we need to use the following two lemmas proved by 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [5] and-Lukaszewicz [ 121, respectively: 
Lemma 1 ([5]). For any extended logic program ZI, 
(a) if Ans is an answer set of IT, then the deductive closure of Ans is an extension 
of D; 
(b) every extension of Ii’ is the deductive closure of exactly one answer set of Il. 
As Gelfond and Lifschitz showed in [5], each rule (20) in Il can be viewed as a default 
L,A .*. AL,: lLm+ ,,..., ~L,,/Lo. Therefore, II can be also viewed as a default theory. 
Lemma 2 ([12]). Let (&,W) be a default theory, Mod(&) the class of all models of 
8 and 0 the set of all subclasses of Mod(d) such that for each @ E 0, there exists 
a set of propositional formulas Il satisfying the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) stated in 
DeJnition 7. Then 
(a) @ is the set of all models of some extension of (-Qz,%?); 
(b) for each extension E of (&,‘%‘), there exists some @ in 0 such that @ is the set 
of all models of E. 
Suppose CT?: = (&‘,V). As we mentioned earlier, the causal theory CT?,’ can be 
viewed as a default theory. Note that if we view each fact L in ._c+? as a default T : IL, 
and view IIF: as a default theory by using Gelfond and Lifschitz’s notation, then l7$ 
is eventually’ identical to CT?;. 
We first prove result (i). If Mod(CTT,‘)= 8, from Lemma 2, it follows that CT?,’ 
does not have an extension or only has an inconsistent extension. Then from Lemma 1, 
it is easy to see that II‘$ does not have an answer set or only has an answer set Lit. 
Similarly, we can prove the other direction of result (i). 
Now we prove result (ii). If S’ E Mod(CT$), then from Lemma 2, it follows that 
S’ is a model of an extension E of CT?;. Since CT?: is identical to default theory 
I$$ from Lemma 1, it is easy to see that E is the deductive closure of an answer set 
Ans of ZIFi. It then follows Ans C S’. 
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Similarly, we can prove the other direction of result (ii). q 
Having Theorem 3, the logic program approximation IZ$ provides a method to 
compute models of causal theory CT, &. acfIt should be noted that the answer set semantics 
can be reduced to the stable model semantics of logic programs [4] without increasing 
the computational cost [5]. Although the computation for stable model semantics is 
still intractable generally, Ben-Eliyahu has recently identified the tractable subclass 
for computing stable models [l] and Niemela and Simons further implemented some 
efficient algorithms to compute stable model semantics [16]. Hence, these results are 
obviously applicable in the implementation of our approach. 
Example 12. The light-power domain revisited. We slightly modify the causal relations 
in Example 7 by specifying 59 = {on-+ light, Ton + llight, Tpower + 4ight). Let 
S = {Zight,on, power} be the initial state and suppose an action of cutting off the 
power (i.e. Post(act) E lpower) is performed on S. Obviously, there exists unique 
6 = {on} which is a maximal subset of S satisfying the conditions that 6 U {Post(act)} 
is consistent and 6 k llight and 6 p light. 
According to the above description, the logic program approximation II$$ of causal 
theory CT?; consists of the following rules: 
Tpower t , 
on+-, 
light + on, not Tlight, 
llight t Ton, 
Tlight c Tpower. 
It is easy to see that IIF: has a unique answer set {Tlight, on, Tpower}, which is also 
the unique resulting state. Clearly, this solution coincides with the result obtained in 
Example 7. 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a new approach for reasoning about action. We have 
seen that to specify effects of actions properly, we need to represent the domain causal- 
ity explicitly in action theories, and distinguishing causal relations as defeasible and 
non-defeasible cases does provide us more flexible capabilities to handle problems of 
reasoning about action effects. 
It should be noticed that specifying a causal relation to be defeasible or non- 
defeasible is domain-specific. It seems that there is no a general principle to define 
which causal relation should be defeasible and which should not be. Given the prob- 
lem domain but with different causal relations, different solutions may be derived even 
for the same action. For instance, in Example 8 presented in Section 4, if a causal 
relation that the fact that some one is not alive causes the fact that he or she is not 
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walking is specified to be defeasible in the sense that even if a person is not alive, he or 
she can be moved by someone else, then we will not be able to derive the qualification 
of an action with effect walking. It is interesting to note that if only defeasible causal 
relations are specified in a domain, all actions then become executable to any state and 
no action qualifications may be derived (we assume that every action’s post-condition 
is consistent with domain constraints). 
The other feature of our approach is that domain constraints still have their conven- 
tional functions and logical forms in our formalism. We believe that having explicit 
representation for domain constraints is important in action theories, as in many situa- 
tions, domain constraints describe some physical properties about the world, and these 
properties may not reflect a natural causality of the domain. For instance, in the blocks 
world, we usually have a domain constraint ~on(box, box) saying that any block cannot 
be located on itself. The other function of the domain constraint is to force some ram- 
ifications during the change that may not be captured by causal relations. For example, 
if we have a constraint stating that any object can only be located on the table or on 
the floor, then an action of removing an object from the table will lead to the effect 
that the object will be on the floor. In such a domain, we do not need to specify an 
extra causal relation like that “the fact that an object is not on the table causes the 
fact that the object must be on the floor”. 
Finally, the logic programming approximation to compute causal theories of actions 
certainly provides an effective way to implement our approach. Here we should mention 
that, however, this approximation is not complete with the following restrictions: (a) 
as arbitrary forms of logic constraints are not expressible in extend logic programs, we 
therefore require 9 = 8 for this translation; (b) specific forms (21) and (22) of causal 
relations are also required; (c) actions should be deterministic. But we would argue that 
restrictions (a) and (b) are not real limitations from a practical point of view, because 
inference rules in logic programs (i.e. rules with the form LO +- Li, . . . , L,) are usually 
strong enough to capture the intuitive meanings of the constraints that are used to char- 
acterize our domains, while many causal relations can be rewritten to forms (21) and 
(22). For instance, the causal relation -on V Tpower + llight in Example 7 can be 
rewritten as two separate causal relations Ton + dight and lpower + dight. Restric- 
tion (c), on the other hand, can be released if we enhance the extended logic programs 
by allowing disjunction occurrence in the head of a rule in logic programs [5]. With 
this augmentation, actions with disjunctive post-conditions will become expressible in 
extended logic programs. 
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